There are many examples of individuals forming coalitions to obtain or protect a valuable resource. We present an analytical model of coalition formation in which individuals seek alliances if they judge themselves too weak to secure the resource alone. We allow coalition seeking to carry an investment cost (h) and let contest outcomes depend probabilistically on the relative fighting strengths of contesting parties, with effective coalition strength directly proportional to combined partner strength. We identify the evolutionarily stable strength thresholds, below which individuals within triads should seek a coalition. We show that if h exceeds a critical value, then unilateral fighting over resources is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Universal (3-way) coalitions are also an ESS outcome if h is less than a second critical value. Both of these extreme solutions are less likely to arise, the greater the variance in fighting strengths and the greater the benefit from dominating opponents. Our analysis also identifies intermediate solutions in which only the weaker individuals seek coalitions: only then can a true coalition (2 vs. 1) form. We characterize these ESSs and show that true coalitions are more likely to arise when the effective strength of a coalition is less than the sum of its individual strengths (antergy). Alliances in primates are characterized by antergy, high reliability of strength as a predictor of contest outcome, and high variability in strengths. These are precisely the conditions in which in our model most favors true coalition formation. Key words: alliance, animal conflict, antergy, coalition, game theory, synergy. [Behav Ecol 18:277-286 (2007)] C oalitions (termed ''alliances'' if they are temporally stable) are ''the joining forces of two or more parties during a conflict of interest with other parties' ' (de Waal and Harcourt 1992; Dugatkin 1998c) . Numerous examples of the phenomenon are found in the natural world, including the collective mobbing of predators (Caro 2005, Chapter 11), group attacks of conspecifics to raise dominance rank (Zabel et al. 1992) , and coalitions among males to gain and defend receptive females (Packer et al. 1991; Caro 1994) . As an example of this latter phenomenon, male bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops spp.) in Western Australia cooperate in the aggressive herding of females, forming groups of 2-3 (first-order alliances) and even larger groups (second-order alliances) to escort and defend them (Connor et al. 1992 (Connor et al. , 1999 . Similarly, in male savanna baboons Papio cynocephalus spp., two or more subordinates may join forces to challenge a more dominant male consorting an estrous female (Noë 1992; Noë and Sluijter 1995) .
There are many examples of individuals forming coalitions to obtain or protect a valuable resource. We present an analytical model of coalition formation in which individuals seek alliances if they judge themselves too weak to secure the resource alone. We allow coalition seeking to carry an investment cost (h) and let contest outcomes depend probabilistically on the relative fighting strengths of contesting parties, with effective coalition strength directly proportional to combined partner strength. We identify the evolutionarily stable strength thresholds, below which individuals within triads should seek a coalition. We show that if h exceeds a critical value, then unilateral fighting over resources is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Universal (3-way) coalitions are also an ESS outcome if h is less than a second critical value. Both of these extreme solutions are less likely to arise, the greater the variance in fighting strengths and the greater the benefit from dominating opponents. Our analysis also identifies intermediate solutions in which only the weaker individuals seek coalitions: only then can a true coalition (2 vs. 1) form. We characterize these ESSs and show that true coalitions are more likely to arise when the effective strength of a coalition is less than the sum of its individual strengths (antergy). Alliances in primates are characterized by antergy, high reliability of strength as a predictor of contest outcome, and high variability in strengths. These are precisely the conditions in which in our model most favors true coalition formation. Key words: alliance, animal conflict, antergy, coalition, game theory, synergy. [Behav Ecol 18:277-286 (2007)] C oalitions (termed ''alliances'' if they are temporally stable) are ''the joining forces of two or more parties during a conflict of interest with other parties' ' (de Waal and Harcourt 1992; Dugatkin 1998c) . Numerous examples of the phenomenon are found in the natural world, including the collective mobbing of predators (Caro 2005 , Chapter 11), group attacks of conspecifics to raise dominance rank (Zabel et al. 1992) , and coalitions among males to gain and defend receptive females (Packer et al. 1991; Caro 1994) . As an example of this latter phenomenon, male bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops spp.) in Western Australia cooperate in the aggressive herding of females, forming groups of 2-3 (first-order alliances) and even larger groups (second-order alliances) to escort and defend them (Connor et al. 1992 (Connor et al. , 1999 . Similarly, in male savanna baboons Papio cynocephalus spp., two or more subordinates may join forces to challenge a more dominant male consorting an estrous female (Noë 1992; Noë and Sluijter 1995) .
So far, there have been surprisingly few quantitative models of coalition formation in natural systems. Noë (1990) forcefully argued that the payoff structure of coalitions in baboon social systems was not adequately captured by the Prisoner's Dilemma model and proposed a simple ''veto game'' as a more appropriate metaphor to capture the dynamic. Noë (1994) subsequently extended his approach by evaluating the likely summed fighting powers of a series of dyadic coalitions and used this information to argue that coalitions should be most frequently formed between individuals of intermediate strength. Dugatkin and Johnstone (Dugatkin 1998c; Johnstone and Dugatkin 2000) investigated the conditions under which focal individuals might be motivated to interfere in fights if, by helping one conspecific win, this behavior increases the chances of the loser subsequently losing against the focal (and the winner subsequently winning, i.e., a ''winner and loser effect,' ' Hsu and Wolf 1999) . Pandit and van Schaik (2003) modeled ''leveling'' coalitions within primates (in which partners are of lesser rank than the challenged individual) and argued that this type of coalition would be most likely to be found when the environmental potential for despotism (the proportionate change in payoff between consecutive ranks) is low. Most recently, Whitehead and Connor used a combination of analytical and simulation models to ask how large should the alliances be and how the rate at which individuals encounter one another influences their propensity to form coalitions .
In this paper, we extend the modeling of coalition formation in several ways. First and foremost, the majority of previous models have concentrated on identifying whether certain coalitions would pay or not pay; here we go one step further by analytically identifying evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) (Maynard Smith 1982) with respect to coalition formation. Like Noë (1994) , Dugatkin (1998c) , and Johnstone and Dugatkin (2000) , we are interested in who forms coalitions with whom, but here we explicitly explore the effects of altering the variance in fighting abilities among individuals rather than assuming fixed strengths at the outset. For the first time, we have also examined how coalition structure is affected when the costs of fights vary according to the relative fighting strengths of contesting parties, so that closely matched parties incur an overall greater fighting cost (see Enquist and Leimar 1983) .
Specific details of our model also differ from earlier published models. In particular, we consider the effects of a potential investment cost to coalition formation through the establishment of allegiances (such as receiving fighting support from partners as a result of being groomed-see, e.g., Hemelrijk 1994; Barrett and Henzi 2001) . We also allow for incomplete information in that we assume a potential collaborator knows its own strength but neither that of its allies nor that of the individuals it challenges. Although an appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of regular allies will no doubt develop over time, early phases of alliance formation must involve considerable uncertainty, and this may remain true with respect to knowledge of the strengths of potential opponents. In baboon societies, for example, newcomers to the population are among the most frequent targets of coalitions (Noë 1992) , whereas dolphin populations may be so large (over 300 in study area of Connor et al. 1992 ) that individual knowledge of competitive strengths of all interacting coalitions would be unlikely.
Coalition sizes in primates are generally small with mean values only slightly exceeding 2 (Packer 1977; Bercovitch 1988; Pandit and van Schaik 2003) , so it is not unreasonable to assume coalitions of 2-3 individuals. Like Dugatkin (1998b) and Johnstone and Dugatkin (2000) , we believe the study of triadic interactions has an important role to play in the study of coalitions because triads are both the simplest groups in which the phenomenon can be studied (2 vs. 1) and the group size that is most analytically tractable, especially when allowing for among-individual variation in fighting strengths. We therefore take an analysis of coalition formation in triads as our starting point for analysis. We note that the ''grand coalition'' of all the players is usually not considered a ''true'' coalition, either in game theory (see, e.g., MestertonGibbons 2001, p. 128) or in behavioral ecology (see, e.g., Boehm 1999, p. 3) . We are therefore especially interested in identifying the circumstances in which a true coalition of less than all the players-in our case, of 2 versus 1-is most likely to arise.
MATHEMATICAL MODEL
Technical details of the following model appear in the supplementary material. We assume that each member of a triad knows its own strength but not that of either partner. All 3 strengths are drawn from the same distribution with probability density function g on [0, 1]. In nature, distributions of fighting ability are typically fairly symmetric (see, e.g., McDonald 1981, p. 135 et seq.) , so an appropriate choice of distribution for theoretical purposes is one that is perfectly symmetric on [0, 1] with mean ½. We choose the symmetric Beta distribution defined by
where C denotes the Euler gamma function, that is, CðgÞ¼ R N 0 e ÿ n n g ÿ 1 dn (see, e.g., Kempthorne and Folks 1971, p. 107) . For a ¼ 1, this distribution is uniform; for a . 1, it is unimodal, and its variance decreases with a according to
Throughout, we assume that a ! 1o rr 2 1 12 :
COST-BENEFIT ASSUMPTIONS
Stronger animals tend to escalate when involved in a fight, but weaker animals tend not to escalate. We assume that if an animal considers itself too weak to secure a resource alone, then it attempts to form a coalition with everyone else. Let K denote total group fitness (beyond the basic-level accruing equally to all individuals), and let it cost hK (where 0 h , 1) to attempt to make a pact. The attempt may not be successful, in which case, a pact seeker will refuse to fight alone; however, if all agree to a pact, then there are also no fights. We first consider how rewards are split between contestants and then consider the likelihood of winning fights and the cost of fighting. If there are 3 distinct ranks after fighting for a resource, then the alpha individual (overall winner) gets aK where a . ½, the beta individual gets (1 ÿ a)K, and the gamma individual gets zero (i.e., nothing beyond the basic level of fitness). If, on the other hand, there is a 3-way alliance, then each gets 1 3 K. This is also precisely the benefit they receive if they fight one another and end up winning and losing a fight apiece, although here they would have had to pay the cost of fighting. We have so far dealt with 2 of the 3 possible outcomes, namely, all for one (with no fighting) and all fighting with all. But there's a third possibility: 2 against 1. If a coalition of 2 defeats the third individual, then each member of the coalition takes 1 2 K, whereas the third individual takes zero (beyond the basic level). If, on the other hand, the individual defeats the coalition, then it gets aK, whereas each member of the coalition takes 1 2 ð1 ÿ aÞK. For a ¼ 1, there is no benefit to being either the beta or the gamma individual in a dominance hierarchy.
We assume that there is at least potentially a synergistic (or antergistic) effect, so that the effective strength of a coalition of 2 whose individual strengths are S 1 and S 2 is not simply S 1 1 S 2 but rather qfS 1 1 S 2 g, where q need not equal 1: q . 1 for synergy and q , 1 for antergy. We will refer to the multiplier q as the synergicity.
Let p(Ds) denote the probability of winning for a coalition (or individual) whose combined effective strength exceeds that of its opponent by Ds. Clearly,
for all Ds, which implies in particular that p(0) ¼ ½; also, p(Ds Figure 1a for 4 different values of r, which is a measure of the reliability of strength difference as a predictor of fight outcome.
It will be convenient to scale fighting costs with respect to K. Accordingly, let c(Ds)K be the cost of a fight between coalitions whose effective strengths differ by Ds; c must be an even function (i.e., a function of jDsj), and we assume that c(Ds) ¼ 0 for jDsj!2. For jDsj 2, we choose
which is graphed in Figure 1b for 4 different values of k, a measure of the sensitivity of cost with respect to strength difference, in the sense that a small difference in strength implies a large cost reduction when k is very high but virtually no cost reduction when k is very low. It seems reasonable that c should be very low for jDsj . 1 because then, even at moderate reliability, the stronger side is virtually guaranteed to win and so the fight should be over quickly. We assume that fighting costs are equally borne by all members of a coalition. So a lone individual bears the whole cost of fighting, whereas a pair of allies splits the cost equally.
SYNTHESIS OF REWARD
Let u be the alliance threshold for player 1, the potential mutant: if its strength fails to exceed this value, then it attempts to make a mutual defence pact with each of its 278 Behavioral Ecology conspecifics. Let v be the corresponding threshold for player 2, who represents the population. Let X be the strength of the u strategist, and let Y and Z be the strengths of the 2 v strategists: thresholds are assumed heritable and under selection, whereas strengths are environmentally determined. Our strategies evolve in direct response to the distribution in fighting strengths, so that natural selection provides the basis of evaluating the resource-winning power of any given strength. We can now decompose the sample space of strength combinations into 8 mutually exclusive and exhaustive events as indicated in Table 1 .
In case 1, all 3 individuals have below-threshold strengths. So each, including the focal individual F, pays hK to obtain a third of K. In case 2, the strength Y of the v strategist A is above its threshold, but the strength Z of the v strategist B is below its threshold; the strength X of F is also below its threshold, and so F and B make a pact to fight A when the need arises. The total cost of the fight is c(qfX 1 ZgÿY )t oA and half that amount to each of F and B. The probability that fF, Bg wins is p(qfX 1 ZgÿY ); the probability that fAg wins is p(Y ÿ qfX 1 Zg). So the payoff to F is pðqfX 1Z gÿYÞÁf In case 4, F takes on A and B by itself, and so it pays the full cost of fighting (but avoids the cost of pact making). If it wins, it becomes alpha individual, whereas if it loses, it becomes the gamma (lowest ranking) individual. So its payoff is pðX ÿ qfY 1Z gÞ Á fa ÿ cðX ÿ qfY 1Z gÞgK1pðqfY 1Z gÿXÞÁ f0ÿcðqfY1ZgÿXÞgK; which simplifies to
Pact seekers do not fight alone: hence, in case 5, F accepts that it is the gamma individual and has tried to make a pact for nothing (whereas A and B contest dominance). In case 6, B accepts that it is the gamma individual, whereas F contests dominance with A, each paying the full cost of the fight. Hence, the payoff to F is pðX ÿ Y ÞÁfaÿcðX ÿYÞgK1pðY ÿ X ÞÁf1ÿaÿcðY ÿXÞgK;
Case 7 now follows by symmetry.
In case 8, F is involved in a pair of fights, one with each of A and B, whose order does not matter. Conditional on strengths having been drawn from the distribution, the probability that F wins both fights to become the alpha individual is p 2 ¼ p(X ÿ Y)p(X ÿ Z). The probability that F loses both fights to become the gamma individual is p 0 ¼ p(Y ÿ X)p(Z ÿ X). In either case, the outcome of the third contest is irrelevant to the focal individual's payoffs. However, if F wins precisely one contest, then there are 2 possible outcomes for the group as a whole. The first is that either A or B wins twice to become the alpha individual (whereas the other becomes the gamma individual). The probability of this outcome is
The second outcome is that A and B both also win one fight. The probability of this outcome is
Hence the benefit to the focal individual is p 2 Á aK1p 11 Áð1ÿaÞK1p 12 Á Table 1 Payoff to a focal individual F whose strength is X and whose partners are A and B with strengths Y and Z, respectively
P 8 ðX ; Y ; Z Þ¼ffðX;Y;ZÞÿcðX ÿYÞÿcðX ÿZÞgK; ð8aÞ
The reward to a u strategist in a population of v strategists is then
ðx;y;zÞ 2 X i ðu;vÞ P i ðx;y;zÞgðxÞgðyÞgðzÞdxdydz; ð9Þ where g denotes the probability density function of the distribution from which the strengths of the triad are drawn. We assume that g(u) . 0 for all u 2 (0, 1), which holds in particular for a symmetric Beta distribution, that is, for Equation 1.
THE EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGIES
A strategy v is an ESS in the sense of Maynard Smith (1982) if it is uniquely the best reply to itself. For p given by Equation 4, c given by Equation 5, and g given by Equation 1, we are now equipped to calculate the ESS set as a function of 7 parameters, namely, c 0 (maximum fighting cost), q (synergicity), h (pact cost), a (proportion of additional group fitness to a dominant), r (reliability of strength difference as predictor of fight outcome), k (sensitivity of cost to strength difference), and r 2 (variance in fighting strength). There are 3 possibilities. The first is that v ¼ 0 is an ESS: unilateral aggression without coalitions always pays. The second possibility is that v ¼ 1 is an ESS: it always pays to form a pact, which is therefore tripartite. The third possibility is that v is a conditional or ''interior'' ESS, that is, 0 , v , 1: it pays to seek a coalition if insufficiently strong. It is only in this third case that a true coalition can arise.
UNILATERAL AGGRESSION
We find that 0 is an ESS whenever h exceeds the critical value
which increases (making the outcome less likely) with a, r, and c 0 , is independent of q, and decreases with k (such that unconditional aggression is guaranteed to be an ESS in the limit of infinite sensitivity of cost reduction to strength difference for positive h). The dependence of h 2 on r 2 is slightly more complicated. Whenever k, c 0 , and a are all sufficiently large, h 2 increases with r 2 as illustrated by the dashed curves in Figure 2 . Here, the higher the variance, the more costly pact making Critical pact cost h 2 , defined by Equation 10, above which h must lie for unconditional fighting without coalition seeking to be an ESS (dashed curves), and critical pact cost h 1 , defined by Equation 11, below which h must lie for unconditional alliance making to be an ESS (solid curves) as a function of variance for a symmetric Beta distribution of strength when c 0 ¼ 1 ¼ q. Note that h 1 is independent of r because q ¼ 1.
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Behavioral Ecology must be for unconditional fighting without pact formation to be an ESS: if pact making were cheaper at higher variance, then it would pay at least the weakest animals to seek a pact. Decreasing either c 0 or a not only lowers the dashed curves in Figure 2 but also flattens them out, so that eventually (i.e., as c 0 / 0 and a / ½) h 2 either increases only very weakly with r 2 or even slightly decreases; however, h 2 itself is then either only marginally positive or even negative. Thus, the more important point is that it is possible for unconditional aggression to be an ESS even if pact making is costless (h ¼ 0), as is illustrated by the lower panels of Figure 2 .
TRIPARTITE COALITION
We find that 1 is an ESS whenever h is lower than a second critical value
; a; r ; k; c 0 ; qÞ
which decreases (making the outcome less likely) with r 2 , k, and a and increases with c 0 . Without a synergistic effect, h 1 is independent of the reliability; however, when q 6 ¼ 1, h 1 increases with r for q . 1 but decreases with r for q , 1, as illustrated by Figure 3 .
That h 1 decreases with a, whereas h 2 increases with a means that increasing a makes the conditions for universal war and peace both harder to satisfy. One can readily understand why increasing a makes universal peace harder: the strongest animals have more to fight for. It is less obvious why increasing a makes universal war harder. But the absence of universal war simply means that the weakest animals aren't aggressive; and realistically, the best the weakest animals can hope for through aggression is to become the beta individual, which is worth less when a is greater.
To have h above the dashed curve in Figure 2 would mean unconditional war without coalition building; to have h below the solid curve would mean universal peace. Thus, Figure 2 suggests that all-out war and all-out peace are both possible at low variance for a wide range of values of a, r, and h (at least for sufficiently large k) but that only one is possible at high variance, except in a narrow range of values of h for sufficiently low r and a. The first impression is corroborated by a simple discrete game of coalition formation, described in the supplementary material, which indicates that war and peace should typically both be ESSs at zero variance.
The effect of synergy on the critical pact cost for an ESS of 1 is illustrated by Figure 3 . We can identify 3 regimes: synergy (q . 1), absence of synergistic effects (q ¼ 1), and antergy (q , 1). With synergy, the higher the reliability of contest outcome, the greater the likelihood of universal peace through a tripartite coalition: equivalently, the greater the extent to which a 2-versus-1 contest would be a lottery (low reliability), the greater the incentive for the strongest individual to fight the remaining pair. With antergy, the lower the reliability, the greater the likelihood of universal peace: equivalently, the higher the reliability, the greater the incentive for the strongest individual to exploit the reduction of handicap against a pair that antergy then affords. In the absence of any synergistic effect, reliability has no impact on the likelihood of universal peace: as q approaches 1, whether from above or below, the curves for different values of r in Figure 3 all approach the dotted curve, preserving their order in the process (i.e., the highest value of r always corresponds to the uppermost curve for q . 1 but the lowermost curve for q , 1).
INTERIOR ESSs
We find that there is an interior ESS at v if both w(v) ¼ 0 and v(v) , 0, where w and v are complicated functions defined in the supplementary material. If h 1 , h , h 2 , so that neither 0 nor 1 is an ESS, then w(0) . 0 . w(1), implying that w(v) ¼ 0 must have at least one solution; however, there may be more than one solution, as illustrated by Figure 4 .
For arbitrary values of the 7 parameters c 0 , q, h, a, r, k, and r 2 , all solutions v of w(v) ¼ 0 are readily found by numerical methods; and if v(v) , 0, then v is at least a local ESS. To establish that v is also a global ESS, we must verify that f(u, v) , f (v, v) , for all u 2 [0, 1] such that u 6 ¼ v, which is again straightforward to achieve by numerical methods: in essence, one plots the graph of f(u, v) on [0, 1] as a function of u to establish that u ¼ v yields a unique maximum. Furthermore, an interior ESS v is ''continuously stable'' (Eshel 1983) or, equivalently, ''convergence stable'' (Christiansen 1991) if q(v) , 0, where q is another complicated function defined in the supplementary material. Convergence stability ensures that v is accessible by a non-v population. Note that convergence stability is an issue only for interior ESSs: if 0 or 1 is an ESS, then it is invariably accessible by a non-0 or non-1 population, respectively.
Figure 3
Critical pact cost h 1 , defined by Equation 11, below which h must lie for universal coalition seeking to be an ESS, as a function of variance for a symmetric Beta distribution of strength when k ¼ 25, c 0 ¼ a ¼ 1, and q ¼ 1 (so that h 1 is independent of r, dotted curve) and for various other values of q and r (as indicated).
We begin by describing how the reliability of contest outcome (r) affects the ESS, which we denote by v * (r) when the other 6 parameters are held constant. The results of a typical such calculation are illustrated by Figure 4 , which shows In general, there are 2 possible pairs of critical values for r. The first pair consists of the highest value at which 0 is an ESS, denoted by r 0 , and the lowest value at which 1 is an ESS, denoted by r 1 . The second pair of values, denoted by m 1 and m 2 , yields the lower and upper limits of an interval in which the ESS is not unique: for m 1 , r , m 2 , v ¼ v * (r)i s either a doubly or a triply valued function.
These points are illustrated by Figure 4a , where r 0 12.4, m 1 24.1, m 2 24.9, and r 1 does not exist: although v * (r) continues to increase at higher values of r than are shown in the diagram, it never reaches the value 1 and instead approaches the asymptote v * (N) 0.9. For this relatively low maximum cost (here c 0 ¼ 0.1), v * (r) is zero for r , r 0 ,i s unique and increasing for r 0 , r , m 1 , is triply valued for m 1 , r , m 2 , and is again unique and increasing for r . m 2 . At higher maximum cost (here c 0 ¼ 0.3), however, the picture changes as illustrated in Figure 4b , where m 1 2 and r 0 ¼ m 2 2.6. There is still a narrow range of values of r for which w(v) ¼ 0 has 3 solutions v; however, only the largest corresponds to an interior ESS because v(v) . 0 for the other two. Thus, v * (r) ¼ 0 for r , m 1 ; there are 2 ESS thresholds, a high one and zero, for m 1 , r , m 2 ; and v * (r) is unique for r . m 2 and increases toward the asymptote v * (N) 0.97. We note in passing that the upper branch of the curve in Figure 4b could be continued leftward as a local ESS (which can be invaded by zero), before even the local ESS disappears at r 1.5; however, only global ESSs are shown in our diagrams. Finally, at even higher maximum cost, for example, with c 0 replaced by 0.5 in Figure 4 , there are no interior ESSs; however, v ¼ 1 is always an ESS (because w(1) . 0, or equivalently h , h 1 ). Summarizing, in the absence of a synergistic effect (q ¼ 1) and for sufficiently low maximum fighting cost, the evolutionarily stable threshold for forming coalitions is low at low reliability of contest outcome but increases quite rapidly across a relatively narrow transition region to become high at high reliability.
Even a modest synergistic effect appreciably widens this transition region, as illustrated by Figure 5a . It is now important to note that when m 1 , r , m 2 , the high ESS threshold and the low ESS threshold are both always found to be convergence stable, whereas the intermediate threshold is not; for example, when r ¼ 16 in Figure 5a , the 3 ESSs are v 1 0.076 with v(v 1 ) ÿ0.039 and q(v 1 ) ÿ0.11; v 2 0.3 with v(v 2 ) ÿ0.14 and q(v 2 ) 0.11; and v 3 0.96 with v(v 3 ) ÿ0.63 and q(v 3 ) ÿ0.19. So what we expect to happen in a population where r increases sufficiently slowly that the population always tracks the ESS-where, and only where, it is convergence stable-is that it will follow the curve in Figure 5a until it starts to bend back and then jump to the upper branch as indicated by the solid arrow. Conversely, in a population where r decreases sufficiently slowly, the population will jump from the upper branch to the lower one as indicated by the dotted arrow.
THE PROBABILITY OF TRUE COALITION FORMATION
In a population at the ESS, there are 4 possible outcomes for every triad that draws 3 strengths from the distribution. The probability of a 3-way struggle for dominance is
,where v * denotes the ESS; if v * ¼ 0, then p 0 ¼ 1. The probability of a 3-way alliance is
with p 3 ¼ 1i fv * ¼1. Similarly, the probability of a lone alliance seeker ceding to a 2-way struggle for dominance between the other 2 individuals is the probability that 2 of the strengths X, Y, Z lie above the threshold v * , whereas the other one lies below it, or
Finally, and of special interest, the probability of a 2-way alliance against the third individual is the probability that 2 of the strengths X, Y, Z lie below the threshold v * , whereas the other one lies above it, or
Because Equation 13 is zero if either v * ¼ 0o rv * ¼1, the probability p 2 of a true alliance (of 2 individuals against the third) is nonzero only for an interior ESS. To illustrate, suppose that in Figure 5b , the population tracks the ESS as r increases from a very low to a very high value, jumping from the lower curve to the upper curve as r passes through m 2 (equal to r 0 in this case). Then p 2 is always zero because v * ¼ 0 jumps from 0 to 1 as r crosses 2.6. By contrast, in Figure 4 or in Figure 5a , the probability of a true alliance can be substantial. Suppose, for example, that the population tracks the ESS in Figure 4a as r increases from a very low to a very high value, jumping from the lower to the upper branch of the curve as r passes through m 2 24.9. Then p 2 varies as shown by the solid curve in Figure 6a . If q is increased by 20% but all other parameters retain their values, however, then p 2 varies as shown in Figure 6b instead. Thus, the probability of a true alliance is much lower with synergy than without it: synergy encourages a 3-way alliance, as indicated by Figure 6 .
EFFECT OF VARIANCE
To describe how variance r 2 affects the probability p 2 of a true coalition, we first describe how it affects the ESS, which we therefore denote by v * (r 2 ). The results of a typical calculation are illustrated by Figure 7a , which shows v ¼ v * (r 2 ) for k ¼ 50, h ¼ 0, r ¼ 30, q ¼ 1, a ¼ 1, and c 0 ¼ 0.1. For very low variance, the ESS is multivalued; for example, when r 2 ¼ 0.002, the 3 ESSs are given by v * 0.357, v * 0.454, and v * 0.95, all of which are convergence stable. Nevertheless, it is likely that the multivalued ESS region is of greater mathematical than biological interest, for 2 reasons. The first is that a multivalued ESS requires a lower coefficient of variation than we would expect to observe in practice (see, e.g., Noë 1994). For example, the ESS is multivalued in Figure 7a only if r 2 is less than about 0.00425 or if the coefficient of variation in strength is less than about 13%, which would be exceptionally low. The second reason is that, because the ESS is convergence stable, if ever the variance were high enough to make the ESS unique, then the population would track the upper curve-even if the variance subsequently became extremely low. Accordingly, in Figure 7b , we plot p 2 and p 3 only for the upper curve of Figure 7a .
EFFECT OF SYNERGICITY
We already know from Figure 7 that the probability of interest p 2 increases with variance and from Figure 6 that it remains nonnegligible in the limit as r / N. Therefore, to explore how synergicity q affects the ESS, for the remainder of this section, we assume that both reliability and variance are maximal; and in this limit, we denote the ESS by v * (q).
The results of a typical calculation are illustrated by Figure 8a , which shows v ¼ v * (q) for h ¼ 0, a ¼ 1, c 0 ¼ 0.1, and 2 different values of k. The ESS is unique and convergence stable. For the maximum-variance (uniform) distribution, we infer from Equation 1 with a ¼ 1 and from Equation 13 that G(v * ) ¼ v * and p 2 ¼ 3v * 2 f1 ÿ v * g, which is maximal when v * ¼ 2 3 . Thus, we can infer the value of q that yields the maximum probability p 2 of a true coalition as easily from Figure 8a -as indicated by the dotted lines-as from Figure 8b , where p 2 itself is plotted against q. What we find is that the relevant synergicity is always less than 1 and increases slightly with k. Thus, antergy is conducive to true coalitions, although not directly: antergy is conducive to the strongest individual going it alone rather than joining a tripartite coalition, which gives rise to 2 versus 1 as opposed to all for one.
DISCUSSION
Given the nonlinearities involved in our predictions, it is useful to consider the approximate sizes of parameters such as q, r, and k in natural systems. Noë (1994) noted that the strengths of 2 individuals would be greater than the sum of their individual strengths (i.e., q . 1) if they attacked opponents in a coordinated manner. However, he also noted his general impression that at least one of the partners in the coalition did not pull its weight, so that q , 1. By contrast, Whitehead and Connor (2005) assumed that the alliance with the greatest net competitive ability always won, so that q . 1, whereas Dugatkin and Johnstone simply assumed that 2 always beat one (Dugatkin 1998a; Johnstone and Dugatkin 2000) . Pandit and van Schaik (2003) linked strengths to fighting motivations (in turn influenced by rank) but assumed that coalition strength was the sum of individual components, so that q ¼ 1. Naturally, the value of q will vary from system to system, but we suspect the very lowest and highest possible values of q are 1 2 and 2, respectively, and that in practice q lies much closer to 1.
Models of coalition formation have tended simply to assume that the stronger party always wins any contest (e.g., Noë 1994; Pandit and van Schaik 2003; Whitehead and Connor 2005 ), but it is clear that probabilities of winning and losing are influenced by a wide variety of factors (for a recent review, see Rutte et al. 2006) , such that even dominants can occasionally lose. For example, it has been noted that juvenile baboons are more likely to win disputes with larger animals when their mothers are nearby, suggesting that even the possibility of coalitionary support may affect the outcome (Walters 1980; Silk et al. 2004 ). The value of r (a measure of the reliability of the difference in fighting strength in predicting fight outcome) is therefore challenging to quantify in systems involving coalitions. Noë (1992) discussed the difficulty of measuring fighting strengths in savannah baboons because dominant males consistently won fights, which in itself suggests high r. By contrast, spotted hyenas Crocuta crocuta intervene in fights by supporting the dominant individual of the fighting pair, even if the dominant was losing a fight (Engh et al. 2005) , suggesting somewhat lower r at least for dyadic contests. Our overall impression is that the predictability of contest outcomes when based on physical prowess and strength is relatively high; so, while acknowledging that numerous factors influence the stochastic nature of contest winning, we suspect that r at least exceeds 10 and that much higher values are far from uncommon.
Parameter k (a measure of the sensitivity of costs to differences in fighting strength) is one of the most difficult to estimate directly, not least because our cost function is just one of many we could have chosen. Our assumption that fighting costs decrease with difference in fighting strength can be justified on the basis of some form of sequential assessment of fighting skill (see, e.g., Enquist and Leimar 1983) . Contests involving mismatched opponents tend to be of short duration (e.g., Morrell et al. 2005 ), but it is recognized that alternative hypotheses for the same general phenomenon, including 1-sided assessment of fighting strengths, are possible (Taylor and Elwood 2003) . Contest durations do not in general tend to decline to negligible lengths even for moderate differences in size or strength (but see Moya-Laraño and Wise 2000) , so given cost function (Equation 5), we suspect that k at least exceeds 25 but does not greatly exceed 50 in most instances.
There is some debate as to whether activities like grooming are actually traded for coalitionary support (Barrett and Henzi 2001) , and the cost of pact formation (h) may be hard to isolate and measure, especially when multiple commodities are exchanged for assistance such as grooming. Our analysis allows us to ignore pact formation costs altogether (by setting h ¼ 0), but it is clear that the size of such investments can have a central role in determining whether alliances form in the first place (see below). Similarly, one might argue that when resources are fought over, the winners tend to get the entire resource and the losers gain nothing, so that there are generally no ''medals for coming second.'' Setting a ¼ 1 captures this outcome, but a lower value of a also allows us to introduce the possibility of second-placed individuals having a limited share of the contested resource (the ''leftovers'').
We now consider some of the key properties of our model. Our first conclusion is that if the cost of pact formation (h) exceeds a critical value, then unconditional aggression without coalitions will be an ESS. Such a threshold is intuitively reasonable-clearly, coalitions will not form if pact formation is prohibitively expensive. However, the factors that influence where this threshold lies are of more interest. The critical pact cost beyond which multilateral fighting without coalitions will occur increases (thereby making coalition seeking more likely) as the underlying variance in fighting abilities (r
and c 0 ¼ 0.1, which is multivalued when the variance is very low. (b) The probability p 2 of a true alliance (solid curve) and the probability p 3 of peace (dashed curve) when the population tracks the high ESS in the diagram on the left.
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Behavioral Ecology increases, because relatively weak individuals face greater pressure to form pacts, and there will always be greater disparity in fighting strengths at high variance. Fighting abilities in populations of primates do seem to be highly variable-Noë (1994) for example, argues for large differences in strength among male savannah baboons (to such an extent that a highranking male could defeat several low-ranking males simultaneously), and our analysis indicates that these are just the sort of conditions in which coalition formation would be favored. As might be expected, when the cost of fighting is low (c 0 low, or k / N, so that only closely matched fighters pay a significant cost), then aggression without pact formation will arise, particularly when there is also a cost to pact formation. By contrast, when the outcome of fights is highly predictable (i.e., r high as we anticipate, see above), there is less value in individuals taking their chances and going it alone, so coalition formation pays. These sorts of considerations may collectively help explain why coalitions are evident in some social systems but not in others.
Our second central conclusion is that if the costs of pact formation are below another critical value, then unconditional coalition seeking is an ESS. Again, in a general sense, such a threshold might be anticipated because coalitions are more likely to be sought when pact formation is cheap. Collectively, this means that there is the possibility of 2 extreme ESSs (all fighting it out alone and all forming coalitions), and indeed we have shown that there are conditions under which both strategies simultaneously represent uninvadable solutions (Figure 2 ). In these instances, there is selection against the rare individual seeking to form coalitions in a population of go-it-alones (why pay a cost of attempted pact formation when no individual will heed your call for assistance?) and selection against the rare individual seeking to go-it-alone in a population of coalition seekers (a sure way to get beat up). Our analysis shows that these 2 ESSs are simultaneously possible for a range of pact costs h when there is relatively low variation in fighting abilities (r 2 ). However, as the variance in fighting strengths increases, there tends to be a single extreme ESS, that of universal alliance seeking at low h and unilateral aggression at high h. Interestingly, increasing the value of dominating opponents (a) makes the conditions for both extreme ESSs harder to satisfy-the stronger animals have more to fight for by going it alone, whereas the weaker animals have more incentive to form coalitions. Increasing the value of q (the degree of synergy when combining fighting strengths) also had some intriguing effects. Somewhat surprisingly, higher q does not automatically lead to a greater tendency of individuals to seek coalitions-indeed when fighting ability is a poor indicator of contest outcome (r low), then it makes coalition seeking less likely, see Figure 3 .
The third portion of our analysis indicates that although thresholds of 0 (never form coalitions) and 1 (always form coalitions) may be evolutionarily stable, there are also solutions in which the threshold is somewhere in between, so that stronger animals fight alone and weaker animals seek alliances. The ''S'' shaped curves such as those depicted in Figure 5 indicate that even here there may be more than one such ESS solution for particular sets of conditions. Once again, we see that as the reliability of strength as a predictor of contest outcome (r) increases, then so does the ESS strength threshold below which coalitions will be sought: building alliances makes more sense if it has a clear impact on ability to win fights. More importantly, we see that 2-versus-1 coalitions are most likely to arise when a degree of antergy exists, so that q , 1, and the variance in fighting strengths is high.
In sum, unconditional individual aggression without coalitions will tend to arise when (i) the cost of pact formation is high, (ii) the cost of fighting is low, and (iii) the reliability of strength as a predictor of contest outcome is low. By contrast, universal resolution of disputes through sharing will tend to arise when (iv) the cost of pact formation is low, (v) the cost of fighting is high, and (vi) the reliability of strength as a predictor of contest outcome is high, so long as there is also synergy when strengths are combined. Either unconditional individual aggression without coalitions or universal resolution of disputes through sharing is less likely to be the ESS outcome when (vii) the benefit from dominating opponents is high and (viii) the variance in fighting strengths is high. If (dependent on conditions (i)-(vi)) one of these extremes is indeed the ESS outcome when (vii)-(viii) hold, then it will tend to be the unique ESS outcome; whereas it will tend to be one of a pair of alternative ESS outcomes (decided by chance) when the benefit from dominating opponents and the variance in fighting strengths are low. Finally, 2-versus-1 coalitions are more likely to occur when (ix) the reliability of strength as a predictor of contest outcome is high, (x) a degree of antergy in combining fighting strengths exists, and there is high variation in fighting strengths. These are just the sorts of conditions that appear to characterize coalitions found in primate societies.
Of course, all models simplify, and ours is no exception. Several assumptions have been made to facilitate analysis and to avoid introducing too many parameters. First and foremost, in assuming that all individuals with strength below a threshold seek coalitions, we have allowed for neither partner choice nor more sophisticated decision making in which a coalition blocks the entry of an outsider wishing to join. Noë's (1990) application of the veto game, for instance, assumes that individuals compete for the favors of others. Our current model could in theory be extended to consider these factors, but simplifications would have to be made elsewhere for it to remain analytically tractable. Second, we have assumed that if a coalition party wins a dispute over a resource, then the resource is divided evenly among coalition members. In both dolphins and primates, the subsequent division of benefits among alliance members is unclear, but it has been suggested that it ranges from relatively even (Noë 1992) to uneven (with greater competitors securing greater benefit: see Noë 1992; Whitehead and Connor 2005) . If the benefits were apportioned more according to relative strengths, then one might expect there to be less incentive for weaker members to form coalitions, although having some share of the bounty will still be better than having none. We have also assumed that pact investment costs (h) are fixed and independent of the number and strengths of potential allies. It is possible that pact investment costs vary according to the likely strength of the ally, but to understand its effect, one would need to conduct a rather different form of analysis from the one presented. On a related matter, one might wonder how coalition seeking can ever spread within a population in which no one else is willing to assist, but here we note that we have assumed coalition seekers do not tend to escalate in disputes when they are alone. Hence, with high fighting costs, coalition forming may be selected from rarity through its effect on avoiding fights, rather than through its effect on forming bonds per se. Separating the tendency to form coalitions from a tendency to back down when alone may prove fruitful, although the 2 behaviors are likely to be very closely linked in natural systems.
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A. Calculation of the reward function and ESS
Let denote the distribution function, i.e., define ´ µ Ê ¼ ´ µ . Then, on noting from Table 1 that the first and fifth integrals of (9) are separable and that each of the others contains a separable integral, and combining both the second integral with the third and the sixth with the seventh and simplifying, we obtain Note also that, if ¼, then unconditional aggression must be an ESS in the limit of infinite sensitivity because the first term of (A4) approaches zero as ½ while the remaining terms in this expression are negative. As remarked in the Discussion, we suspect that would at least exceed 25 but not greatly exceed 50, and these are the values we have used for in all of our illustrations. We can bolster our suspicions as follows. If one side has an advantage over the other of the effective equivalent of one individual of maximum strength or more, then the cost should be negligible, and requiring to be bigger than 25 makes the cost less than 0.1% of the maximum cost. On the other hand, if one side has an advantage over the other of only the effective equivalent of one individual of average strength, then the cost should not be entirely negligible, and if were much larger than 50 it would be less than 4% of the maximum.
Correspondingly, 1 is at least a local ESS if (A2) is positive for Ú ½ in the vicinity of Ù ½. (To establish that ½ is also a global ESS, we verify numerically that ´Ù ½µ ´½ ½µ for all Ù ¼ ½.) Because usually ´½µ ¼ even though ´Ùµ ¼ for all Ù ¾´¼ ½µ, the sign of (A2) for Ú ½ in the vicinity of Ù ½ is determined by the sign of the limit as Ù ½ and Ú ½ of the large term in squiggly brackets, which reduces to Figures A1 and A2 supplement Figure 3 of the main article by further illustrating the dependence of ½ on the six parameters ¾ , «, Ö, , ¼ and Õ. We have chosen values of Õ between 0.5 and 1.5 in these illustrations because, as remarked in the Discussion, we suspect that Õ at least exceeds ½ ¾ but never exceeds 2. We can bolster these suspicions as follows. The justification for Õ ½ ¾ is that effective fighting strength should at least exceed average fighting strength. The justification for Õ ¾ is that the strength difference between a pair of average individuals and an individual of maximum possible strength is Õ´½ ¾ · ½ ¾ µ ½ Õ ½, which should not yield an advantage of more than the maximum possible strength. Note that, unless the reliability is unrealistically low, the maximum in Figure A2 always obtains for Õ ½. Thus, with high reliability, synergy is more conducive to universal peace than either the absence of a synergistic effect or antergy.
For an interior ESS Ú ¾´¼ ½µ we require Ù
But on differentiating (A2) with respect to Ù and then setting Ù Ú, and with the help of (8) of maximum. The curves must cross at Õ ½ because then ½ is independent of Ö.
B. On the limit of maximum reliability and variance
From (1), (4) and (5) in the limit of maximum reliability and variance, i.e., as Ö ½ and ¾ ½ ½¾ , we find that (A4) reduces to
where is the incomplete Beta function, (A7) reduces to 
The above expressions are used in the main article to determine the asymptotes (dotted lines) in Figure 4 and the effects of synergicity in Figure 8 .
C. A discrete coalition formation game
For the usual reasons-in essence, with an analytical model it is almost always necessary, not only for tractability but also for clarity of insight, to exclude effects the spotlight isn't on-in the main body of the paper with continuous variation of strength we have ignored winner and loser effects (Hsu and Wolf, 1999; Rutte et al., 2006) , but here we include them. Accordingly, consider a game among animals who interact in triads chosen randomly from a large population. An animal is called naive if it has yet to engage in a contest with another member of its triad, and otherwise experienced; and variance in strength is assumed to be zero so that any contest between two naive individuals is equally likely to be won by either. But a winner has a higher probability ½ ¾´½ · Ûµ of winning a subsequent contest with a naive individual; a loser has a lower probability ½ ¾´½ Ðµ of winning a subsequent contest with a naive individual; and because a winner is ½·Û ½ Ð times as likely as a loser to defeat a naive opponent, the probability that a winner defeats a loser in a subsequent contest is
(with ¼ Ð Û ½). Also, two winners are equally likely to win in a subsequent contest, and similarly for losers.
There are two strategies, called Cooperate and Defect, or and for short. A cooperator will offer to make a pact for mutual defense and sharing of benefits with each of the other individuals in its triad, at a cost of £. A defector, on the other hand, will fight for the greatest possible share of benefits. Thus, in a population of defectors there will be three pairwise contests, one between two naive individuals, one between a naive and an experienced individual, and one between two experienced individuals; all possible orders of interaction are assumed to be equally likely. Consequently, there are two possible overall outcomes for a triad of defectors. The first is a linear dominance hierarchy, which arises if one animal wins twice (implying that another loses twice). The second is a circular arrangement, which arises if each animal wins and loses a contest. In the first case, we assume that the alpha individual's benefits from its position exceed those of the gamma individual by «£ units and that the beta individual's benefits exceed those of the gamma individual by´½ «µ£ units, where ½ ¾ « ½. In the second case, we assume that the total excess of £ is divided equally among the triad. The cost of fighting is ¼ £ per contest (the maximum, because of zero variance). Thus all possible payoffs are as listed in Table C1 , each with its associated conditional probability. If, for each of the 22 possible outcomes, is the conditional probability of outcome and È the associated payoff to a focal individual, then (because all types of contest are equally likely) the expected benefit or reward is 
after simplification. This is the reward to each -strategist in a population ofstrategists. A triad of cooperators will always share, incurring only the pact-building cost of £, and so the reward to a -strategist in a population of -strategists is ½ ¿ £ £. Now consider a mutant -strategist in the population. Its two companions are -strategists with a mutual defense pact, and so the allocation of benefits will be determined by a single contest between the -strategist and the coalition of -strategists. If the -strategists win, then they will share £ and the dominated -strategist will obtain 0. If the -strategist wins, then it will obtain «£ and dominate the coalition, who will share´½ «µ£. Let ¼ be the probability that a single individual prevails over a coalition of two. Then the -strategist's payoff will be´« ¼ µ£ with probability ¼ and ¼ £ with probability ½ ¼ , so that the reward to a -strategist in a population of -strategists is´« ¼ ¼ µ£. Finally, a mutant -strategist in a population of -strategists accepts that it is the gamma individual of its triad, and has merely incurred-to no avail-the pact-building cost of £. Thus the reward matrix for the game is given by
(where is the reward to an -strategist in a population of -strategists). Because, in discrete population games, a strategy is an ESS if the largest element in its reward-matrix column is the diagonal one, it now follows that is an evolutionarily stable strategy if 
